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MASTERING A TWO-EDGED SWORD: LESSONS
FROM THE RULES AND LITIGATION ON
SAFEGUARDS IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
Julien Chaisse, Debashis Chakraborty & Animesh Kumar*
INTRODUCTION
The Uruguay Round discussions of GATT and the subsequent
agreement liberalizing trade beginning in the mid-nineties through
the WTO framework led to a considerable decline in tariff barriers
among the Member countries. However, several non-tariff barriers
(“NTBs”) increased simultaneously with the decline of tariffs. These
NTBs include environmental and technical standards, dumping of
products, provision of actionable subsidies, and misuse of rules of origin. Incorporation of a strong framework of trade remedial measures is
an integral part of the WTO architecture. This architecture will
counter unfair trade practices like dumping and the unequal subsidizing of partner countries, as well as a sudden surge in imports
The smooth functioning of the trade remedial measures,
namely, the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (“ADA”), the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“ASCM”), and the Agreement on Safeguards (“ASG”) play a crucial role in ensuring freer
trade.1 Nevertheless, growing misuse of the trade remedial provisions
themselves evolved as a major NTB over the years. From January
* Julien Chaisse is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, Director of the Centre for Financial Regulation and Economic Development (CFRED), Chinese University of Hong Kong. The author can be contacted at: <julien.chaisse@cuhk.edu
.hk>. Debashis Chakraborty is Associate Professor of Economics at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi. He can be contacted at: <debchakra@gmail
.com>. Animesh Kumar is Assistant Professor at the Kamala Nehru College, University of Delhi. He can be contacted at: <animesh012@gmail.com>. Main ideas
and data of the paper were presented at the Asian Society of International Law
(ASIL) Fourth Biennial Conference, New Delhi (India) 13 November 2013 and at
the international trade conference organised by Passau Law Faculty, Passau (Germany) on 22 November 2013. The authors would like to sincerely thank the participants for their comments and suggestions which contributed to improving the
quality of this article.
1
See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
393, 406 (1994). See generally Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 154, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safeg_e/safeint.
htm [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement].
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1995 through August 2014, a total of 4,230 anti-dumping investigations were initiated, with 2,719 investigations resulting in an imposition of final measures. The corresponding figures for countervailing
measures have been 302 and 177 respectively. The WTO-incompatibility of several trade remedial practices has been established, leading to
the withdrawal of key restrictive instruments like zeroing methodology
and Byrd Amendment.2
The third form of trade remedial measure, namely safeguard
(“SG”) actions, has been applied on relatively fewer occasions than the
Anti-Dumping (“AD”) and the countervailing measures (“CVM”) so far.
From March 1995 through October 2014, 255 instances of safeguard
initiations were reported, while 118 final measures were imposed over
the same period. Despite lower numbers of occurrences vis-a-vis ADA
and ASCM provisions, there is reason to believe that ASG provisions
can also be considerably trade distorting, and often the actions of the
importing countries have been questioned.3
Hartigan has noted that “the ASG was negotiated as a response to the increasing use of extra-legal measures, such as voluntary export restraints and orderly marketing agreements, to
restrict imports among contracting parties of the GATT.”4 However,
almost two decades since the inception of the WTO, it is widely viewed
that “as a means of inducing countries to move away from VRAs or
VRA-equivalent measures (antidumping), the Agreement on Safeguards has been an abject failure.”5
SG raises five major problems which we briefly review: SG can
be affected by political and trade policy factors; SG actions within the
regional trade agreements (“RTA”) are getting increasingly important;
potential problems of the ASG framework have been noted from the
legal perspective since its origin; the economic impact of SG; and the
2

As a result, ensuring greater transparency in the operation of trade remedial
measures has already been acknowledged as a major goal of the Doha Development Agenda. VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40606, TRADE REMEDIES
AND THE WTO RULES NEGOTIATIONS (2010). In particular, given the potential implications on livelihood of a considerably large number of people, negotiation for
reducing fisheries subsidies has as an important agenda in recent period. See
Debashis Chakraborty et al., Doha Round Negotiations on Subsidy and Countervailing Measures: Potential Implications on Trade Flows in Fishery Sector, 6 ASIAN
J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y, 201, 201–34 (2011).
3
Chad P. Brown, Why Are Safeguards Under The WTO So Unpopular?, WORLD
TRADE REV. 47, 47–51 (2002).
4
James Hartigan, Making Sense of Safeguards, 5 REV. INT’L ECON. 809, 818
(2011).
5
Dennis Kitt, Note, What’s Wrong with Volunteering? The Futility of the WTO’s
Ban on Voluntary Export Restraints, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 359, 380 (2009).
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potential problems for the newcomers eyeing entry in the importing
country.
• Political factors: The possibility of political and trade policyrelated motivations influencing SG actions has been widely
reported in literature.6 The SG actions of both developed
and developing countries have come under review so far.7
• Regional dimension: SG actions within the RTA framework
have also become increasingly important in recent periods.
As a number of RTAs have entered into force with the objective of providing deeper tariff cuts to the partner countries
vis-a-vis the prevailing most favored nations (“MFN”) rate,
protection of domestic industries in the involved parties
emerge as a major area of concern.8 Several RTAs in the
recent period incorporate SG provisions.9 On the other
hand, the possible violation of MFN through SG provisions
in RTAs is not uncommon either. For instance, the recent
objection raised by the EU against Brazil’s imposition of
fines on table wine deserves mention here. The EU argued
that despite the lack of any sudden and sharp increase in
imports and lack of serious injury, Brazil has introduced SG
measures. Moreover, Brazil excluded the imports from
MERCOSUR countries (where Brazil is a key member)
from its SG investigation.10 A similar concern arose when
the Argentine SG actions against footwear imports from
third countries came under scanner based on the fact that
there was no intra-regional SG mechanism imposed on
MERCOSUR partners. The Dispute Settlement Body
6

See Lihu Chen & Yun Gu, China’s Safeguard Measures Under the New WTO
Framework, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1169-86 (2002).
7
See, e.g., Dukgeun Ahn, Restructuring the WTO Safeguard System, in THE WTO
TRADE REMEDY SYSTEM: EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES 11, 11–31 (Cameron May ed.,
2006) (discussing the manipulation and use of SGs in both developed and developing countries).
8
See PAUL KRUGER, WILLEMIEN DENNER & JB CRONJE, COMPARING SAFEGUARD
MEASURES IN REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 7 (Int’l Center for Trade and
Sustainable Development 2009).
9
For instance, it has been reported that under the EC-CARIFORUM EPA more
flexible SG triggers have been provided to the latter. In addition, CARIFORUM
states are entitled to impose SG measures in the wake of a potential threat to
infant industries (pro-development provision). See U.N. ECLAC, The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): An Assessment of Issues
Relating to Market Access, Safeguards and Implications for Regional Integration,
9–10, U.N. Doc. LC/CAR/L.181 (Nov. 26, 2008).
10
See Committee on Safeguards, Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 27 April
2012, ¶ 13, G/GS/M/41 (July 16, 2012).
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(“DSB”) ruling forced Argentina to dismantle those measures.11 Bronckers noted, “As long as safeguards cover imports ‘from every source,’ the importing country can select
its targets and discriminate.12 Thus, the most efficient importers are not protected by this MFN rule.”13
• Legal factors: SG measures inherently accompany the
processes of liberalization and structural adjustment that
goes along with enhancing market access for imported products.14 Moreover, the instrument is politically necessary in
order to undertake liberalization in the first place and to
find the necessary majorities to do so at home. Members are
thus entitled to unilaterally undertake restrictive measures, whenever trade liberalisations result in difficulties
for domestic producers.15 For instance, the determination of
“significant cause of material injury” is open to interpretation and hence may lead to protectionist policies. As a result, SG measures constantly run the risk of being abused,
as domestic producers may seek excessive relief from policymakers by requesting that they take recourse to such measures. International trade law needs to strike a careful
balance and define conditions for implementing SG measures in sufficiently precise terms. There exists vibrant
literature on this aspect that is becoming increasingly important in the current context.
• Economic dimension: On the economic front, analysing the
trade effects of SG measures over 1995-2000, Bown and McCulloch noted that safeguard actions both explicitly and im11

Elı́as Baracat & Julio J. Nogués, WTO Safeguards and Trade Liberalization
Lessons from the Argentine Footwear Case (World Bank Policy Research, Working
Paper No. 3614, 2005).
12
Marco Bronkers, Nondiscrimination in the World Trade Organization Safeguards Agreement: A European Perspective, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 367, 368 (Kyle W. Bagwell, George A.
Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
13
Id.
14
Robert Wolfe, The Special Safeguard Fiasco in the WTO: The Perils of Inadequate Analysis and Negotiation 6 (Feb. 10, 2009) (Unpublished Paper), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1353909 (“At least three
are relevant in this debate. The first is temporary protection against injurious imports based on an injury test. The second is encouragement to accept liberalization, if available only for products subject to a reduction commitment. The third is
protection from volatility in the global market for all products.”).
15
Yong-Shik Lee, Destabilization of the Discipline on Safeguards? Inherent
Problems with the Continuing Application of Article XIX after the Settlement of the
Agreement on Safeguards, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 1235, 1235 (2001) (Neth.).
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plicitly lead to a departure from MFN principles.16 The
analysis also notes that the economic impact of SG is a
function of the form in which it is applied, and might discourage entry of new suppliers and non-RTA partner exports.17 Instances of procedural stringency have also been
reported in the literature. For instance, Baldwin and Steagall analysed the US International Trade Commission
(“ITC”) actions over 1980-1990 and noted that while calculating serious injury, the ITC applied a higher standard for
SG vis-a-vis the same under AD and CVD cases.18 The optimality of SG as a trade policy tool has also been questioned. As Read observed, the benefits of the SG actions are
much lower than the associated costs.19
• Problems for Newcomers: Finally, another major problem
associated with SG actions is the potential problems for
newcomers. SG measures result in quantitative restrictions
in terms of tariff rate quotas, where licenses are often based
on historical market shares in recent years.20 For obvious
reasons, this practice goes against the interest of countries
who newly enter the market of the importing Member for
the product facing SG actions.21
While the literature on SG actions is quite rich, the analysis on
the related disputes, especially in terms of misuse of the ASG provisions, is a relatively less researched area. In this background, the present paper attempts to understand whether existing WTO SG
provisions are vulnerable to potential misuse. The paper is arranged
along the following lines. The WTO ASG provisions are discussed first,
looking into the provisions susceptible to misuse. The actual violations
of the SG provisions are analyzed next, followed by a policy conclusion
identifying potential reform areas in the agreement.

16

Chad P. Bown & Rachel McCulloch, The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: An
Empirical Analysis of Discriminatory Impact, in EMPIRICAL METHODS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 145, 147 (Michael G. Plummer ed., 2004).
17
Id. at 147, 164.
18
Robert E. Baldwin & Jeffrey W. Steagall, An Analysis of ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases, 130 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHESARCHIV 290, 304 (1994) (Ger.).
19
Robert Read, The Political Economy of Trade Protection: Determinants & Welfare Impact of the 2002 US Emergency Steel Safeguard Measures 1 (Lancaster
Univ. Mgmt. Sch. Working Paper No. 2005/013, 2005), available at http://
eprints.lancs.ac.uk/48759/1/Document.pdf.
20
Brown & McCulloch, supra note 16, at 145.
21
Id.
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I. REGULATING SAFEGUARDS: WTO LAW

AND

PRINCIPLES

The WTO system comprises a number of different safeguard
clauses in various agreements. The principal safeguard provision in
the 1994 Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) is Article
XIX, supplemented by the Agreement on Safeguards which came into
force at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Moreover, certain other
agreements also contain special safeguard clauses: Article 5 of the
Agreement on Agriculture (“AoA”), Article 6 of the ATC (transitional
safeguard mechanism) and Article X of the GATS (the criteria of which
were left to future negotiations).
A. GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards
In general, the following requirements must be met for the
adoption of a SG measure on the import of goods pursuant to Article
XIX of the GATT 1994: there has to be an upward surge of imports of
the product in question.22 This increase must be caused by developments that were not foreseen by the country applying the SG measure
at the time when the relevant obligation, including tariff concessions,
was incurred. Finally, the increase in imports must cause or threaten
to cause “serious injury” to a domestic industry producing a “like” or
“directly competitive” product.23
In a very early dispute under the GATT 1947, the contracting
parties were called upon to review a U.S. safeguard measure against
imports of hats from Czechoslovakia. They examined the measure’s
consistency with Article XIX of the GATT and concluded that the stipulated conditions were fulfilled.24
Since the coming into force of the WTO and the adoption of the
ASG, commentators dispute whether the requirement of unforeseen
developments—as mentioned in Article XIX of the GATT 1994—still
applies, as this criterion is omitted in this agreement.25 Commentators
22

See Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Argentina—Safeguard Measures] (clarifying the relationship between Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the
Agreement on Safeguards). Again, it found these rules to apply concurrently and
avoided finding conflicting norms. Id.
23
See id. (detailing the legal regime of safeguards under the GATT 1994); see also
J. Chaisse, D. Chakraborty, and J. Mukherjee, Deconstructing Service and Investment Negotiating Stance, J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 44–78 (2013).
24
See GATT Contracting Parties, Report on the Withdrawal by the United States
of a Tariff Concession under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, CP/106US (Mar. 27, 1951) at 4, 17 (regarding the requirement of the existence of unforeseen developments).
25
See, e.g., Tilottama Raychaudhuri, The Unforeseen Developments Clause in
Safeguards under the WTO: Confusions in Compliance, 11 ESTEY CENTRE J. INT’L
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state that the drafters deliberately replaced the criterion with other
additional requirements under the agreement.26 In Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, the Appellate Body settled
the issue by applying its doctrine of effective interpretation.27 It established that, despite the omission in the agreement, the existence of
unforeseen developments nevertheless forms a relevant criterion in a
SG investigation.28
Safeguard measures adopted by national authorities so far
have been subject to substantial review in various panel and Appellate
Body reports. The following report examined the different requirements for adopting safeguard measures. The Appellate Body, in US –
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb
Meat,29 assessed the requirement of a “threat of serious injury to domestic producers” as follows: a safeguard measure is imposed on a specific “product,” namely, the imported product.30 The measure may only
be imposed if that specific product (“such product”) is having the stated
effects upon the “domestic industry that produces like or directly comLAW & TRADE POL’Y 302, 311 (2010) (“[d]ebate that persists is whether the increase in imports themselves has to be unforeseen, or should the said increase be
able to be attributed due to unforeseen developments.”); JEANNE J. GRIMMETT,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40844, CHINESE TIRE IMPORTS: SECTION 421 SAFEGUARDS
AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) 3 (2011) (“Although the Agreement
on Safeguards does not contain language requiring the existence of ‘unforeseen
developments,’ the WTO Appellate Body has determined that the requirement
continues to apply.”).
26
See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the
Steel Dispute, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 523, 523–24 (2004). See also Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment and Domestic Health Protections—General exceptions clause as a forced perspective, AM. J. L. & MED. 332–61
(2013).
27
U.N. ECLAC, supra note 9, at 9–10.
28
Argentina—Safeguard Measures, supra note 22, at ¶88 (noting that “the Panel
states that the express omission of the criterion of unforeseen developments” in
Article XIX:1(a) from the Agreement on Safeguards “must, in our view, have meaning. On the contrary, in our view, if they had intended to expressly omit this
clause, the Uruguay Round negotiators would and could have said so in the Agreement on Safeguards. They did not”).
29
Appellate Body Report, United States—Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, ¶ 86, WT/
DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R (May 1, 2001); accord Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis, US – Lamb United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia: What Should Be
Required of a Safeguard Investigation, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 395, 395–430 (2003)
(Eng.) (commenting on this dispute over imported lamb meat).
30
Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 1, at art. 2.1.
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petitive products.”31 . The conditions in Article 2.1, therefore, relate in
several important respects to specific products. In particular, according to Article 2.1, the legal basis for imposing a safeguard measure
exists only when imports of a specific product have prejudicial effects
on domestic producers of products that are “like or directly competitive” with that imported product.32 In our view, it would be a clear
departure from the text of Article 2.1 if a SG measure could be imposed
because of the prejudicial effects that an imported product has on domestic producers of products that are not “like or directly competitive
products” in relation to the imported product.
The problems inherent in the ASG have caused Hartigan to
conclude that “[s]tandards and requirements in the ASG that are technically complex, such as non-attribution, and subjective, such as serious injury and an unforeseen increase in imports, will not be
effective in disciplining the invocation of SG actions to protect import
competing constituents.”33
B. Special Safeguard Clauses
Both the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (“ATC”) and the
AoA contain special safeguard clauses. The former permits members
to apply specific transitional safeguard measures while the latter provides for an elaborate and permanent, price-based SG mechanism for
products specifically listed in the members’ schedules.34 Both are different and mutually exclusive in relation to the general SG clause of
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement.35
Article 6 of the ATC governs a special safeguard clause for the
disciplines under that agreement. The ATC, however, expired after ten
years at the end of 2004.36 The application of the SG clause has given
rise to a number of dispute settlement cases.37 Article 5 of the AoA
provides for two complicated price-based SG mechanisms.38 Both rely
31

Id. at art. 4.1(c)(a) 131 (emphasis added).
Id. at art 2.1.
33
Hartigan, supra note 4, at 810. See generally Julien Chaisse and Puneeth
Nagaraj, Changing Lanes—Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property Rights 37
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 223 (2014).
34
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Jan. 1, 1995, GATT.
35
Id.
36
See generally Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 1, at art. 19.
37
See generally Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton
and Man-Made Fiber, WT/DS24/R (Feb. 25, 1997) (listing the peculiarities of the
safeguard clause).
38
Agreement on Agriculture art. 5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 (1994).
32
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on trigger mechanisms and surcharge tariffs, either based on increased imports or based on declining prices.39
C. Safeguards and Trade in Services
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) does
not contain a safeguard mechanism in comparison to that of the
“GATT 1994” or the special safeguard clauses.40 The matter could not
be resolved during the Uruguay Round negotiations.41 Article X of
GATT explicitly provides that there shall be multilateral negotiations
on the question of emergency SG measures based on the principle of
non-discrimination.42 Traditional safeguard concepts applied to trade
in goods can only, to a certain extent, be analogised to trade in services. Border measures such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions
are not generally available in trade of services.43
II.

MAPPING

THE

USE

OF

SAFEGUARD PROVISIONS

In order to understand the Safeguard imposing behaviour of
the major countries during the Jan. 1, 1995 to Oct. 30, 2014 period, we
have conducted an analysis of the data obtained from WTO Safeguard
Gateway.44 We first review the global trends in SG practice (3.1.), then
the geographical distribution (3.2), and finally the sectoral analysis
(3.3).
39

See Harry de Gorter, Merlinda D. Ingco & Laura Ignacio, Market Access: Economics and the Effects of Policy Instruments, in AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO: CREATING A TRADING SYSTEM FOR DEVELOPMENT 63, 76 (Merlinda D. Ingco & John D.
Nash eds., 2004).
40
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 10, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
154 (1994).
41
See generally General Agreement on Trade in Services, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS] (negotiating the General Agreement on Trade in Services during the Uruguay Round).
42
GATT, art. 10, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
43
See generally Note by the Secretariat, Issues for Future Discussions on Emergency Safeguards, ¶ 5, S/WPGR/W.27/Rev.1 499 (May 7, 1999).
44
See Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules
Through Negotiations and Sanctions: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism
and Dispute Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 153, 158, 170 (2007)
(devolving the methodology from which the analysis in this section is derived); see
also Julien Chaisse and Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s Supremacy in
the International Trade Order – A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT. ECON. L. 1, 9–36 (2013).
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A. Safeguards Activism: Global Trends
Figure 1 reveals the number of global SG initiations and measures fluctuated between 1995 and 2014. The number of SG initiations
increased steadily from 1997 to 2000, peaking with thirty-four initiations reported in 2002. Since then, however, there has been a decline,
with only seven reported cases of initiations during 2005. On the other
hand, in the post-recession period, in line with AD and CVM measures, the number of SG actions has increased considerably, and during 2009, a total of twenty-five initiations were reported.45
Figure 1: Safeguard actions initiated from 1995 to 2013, worldwide
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Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO Safeguards database

The trend of “safeguard-activism” continued in 2010 as well,
with twenty initiations reported and twenty-four reported in 2012. SG
measures have also followed a similar pattern, with fourteen and fifteen measures reported during 2002 and 2003 respectively.46 The
numbers declined in the following years in line with the downward
trend in initiations, but increased to ten and eleven during 2009 and
2011 respectively.47
45

See World Trade Organization, Safeguard Measures by Reporting Member,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safeg_e/SG-Measures_By_Report
ing_Member.pdf (last updated Apr. 30, 2014).
46
See World Trade Organization, Safeguard Initiations by Reporting Member,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safeg_e/SG-Initiations_By_Re
porting_Member.pdf (last updated Oct. 30, 2014).
47
See id.
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B. Geographical Analysis: SG as a Developing Country Phenomenon
Interestingly, unlike AD and CVM, SG measures have been
used more frequently by the developing countries. Figure 2 attempts
to identify the major countries involved in SG actions.
Figure 2: Major Players undertaking Safeguard Actions (1995 to 2014)
35
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Total Measures
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Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO Safeguards database

Although mainly the developing countries are taking recourse
to this policy tool, developed countries occasionally have also adopted
this route. India tops the SG actions list with twenty-nine initiations,
which accounts for 11.37% of the total initiated cases.48 Indonesia,
Turkey and Jordan come next in the list, by accounting for 9.02%,
6.67% and 6.27% of the total initiated cases each, followed by Chile
(5.10%), the US (3.92%) and Ukraine (3.92%).49
Regarding SG measures, India is at the top with 11.86% of the
total measures, Indonesia and Turkey are also at the forefront with
11.02% each.50 Jordan, the Philippines, and Chile come next, collectively accounting for 5.93% of the total SG measures to date.51 Several
least developed countries (“LDCs”) and transition economies have also
taken recourse to SG measure at times. For instance, the Czech Re48

See World Trade Organization, Safeguard Initiations by Reporting Member,
available at http:// www.wto.org/english/tratop_/safeg_e/SG-Initiations_By_Report
ing_Member.pdf (Apr. 30, 2014).
49
See id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
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public (nine initiations), Bulgaria (six initiations), Morocco (six initiations) and Poland (five initiations) deserve special mention.52 As a
whole, if the SG initiations from Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan
and the US are taken aside, the actions by remaining developing countries and LDCs account for 91.76% of the total number of cases, and
the corresponding figure for the top ten user countries stands at
58.86%. In other words, unlike the case of CVM duties,53 SG actions
are mainly a developing country phenomenon. It has been noted in the
literature that the adoption of SG as a trade remedial instrument is
much lower in the EU as compared to AD and CVM.54 However, developed countries have taken recourse to this policy at times.55
Lissel explains the phenomenon by acknowledging that the
“lack of injury test and the lack of compensation makes application
easier since developing countries often lack the capacity and means
allowing them to compensate.”56 However, the same provision may seriously constrain their market access when developed countries adopt
SG measures. For instance, the twenty-one-month steel safeguard in
the US in 2001 and the associated trade effects deserve mention.57
The inclination of developing countries towards using SG actions can be explained by the fact that the importing country, which
takes recourse to SG provisions (additional duties or quotas), needs to
compensate the affected country by allowing it to retaliate accordingly.
However, as per Article 8.3 of the WTO ASG, no retaliation is to be
52

Id; see also Julien Chaisse, Debashis Chakraborty & Biswajit Nag, The ThreePronged Strategy of India’s Preferential Trade Policy: A Contribution to the Study
of Modern Economic Treaties, 26 CONN. J. INT’L L. 415. See generally, Julien
Chaisse, Deconstructing Services and Investment Negotiations – A Case Study of
India at WTO GATS and Investment Fora, 14 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 1, 44–78
(2013).
53
See generally Debashis Chakraborty et al., supra note 2, at 222 (noting that
while Canada, the EU and the US account for 73.47% of all SCM initiations,
China, India, South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand account as target for 50.20% of
these initiated cases and concluding that the low cost economies of Asia are emerging as the major targets of SCM activism in developed countries).
54
See Edwin Vermulst & Brian Gatta, Concurrent Trade Defense Investigations in
the EU, the EU’s New Anti-Subsidy Practice Against China, and the Future of
Both, 11 WORLD TRADE REV. 527, 530–31 (2012).
55
See Edwin Vermulst et al., RECENT EC SAFEGUARDS’ POLICY: “KILL THEM ALL
AND LET GOD SORT THEM OUT?” at 1–3, http://www.vvgb-law.com/wp-content/up
loads/2013/02/Vermulst-Recent (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).
56
Elenor Lissel, Regional Safeguard Measures: An Incentive to Sign Regional
Trade Agreements Without Taking Into Consideration the Special Needs for Developing Countries, 23 (Sept. 2011) (unpublished dissertation, Lund University paper
collection).
57
Ritu Lodha, US Steel Safeguard Dispute: Forged Protection Brought to Light,
CUTS Trade Law Brief No. 3 (2005) (describing the steel safeguard and its effects).
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applied for three years since the implementation of the SG measure.
This provides a crucial protection to the developing countries, and in
particular, to their local firms.58
C. Sectoral Analysis: Primary Sector, Low-Tech or High-Tech
Products?
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the major sectors that are
affected by the SG actions.
Figure 3: Major Sectors affected by Safeguard Actions (1995 to 2014)
50

Total Initiations

Total Measures

45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
Machinery and
Mechanical
Appliances

Base Metal and
Articles of Base
Metal

Articles of Stone,
Plaster, Cement etc.

Footwear, Headgear
etc.

Textile and Textile
Articles

Plastic, Rubber etc.

Chemical and Allied
Products

Foodstuff and
Beverages

Vegetable Products

Animal Products

0

Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO Safeguards database

It is observed that chemical and allied products suffer most
from SG initiations (16.86% of the total cases), followed by the base
metals and articles of base metal (16.47%), articles of stone, plaster,
cement etc. (9.02%), foodstuffs and beverages (8.24%), animal products
(7.06%), vegetable products (7.06%), textile and textile articles
(6.27%), and machinery and mechanical appliances (5.88%). Final
measures have been imposed more frequently on chemical and allied
products (22.03% of the total cases), base metals and articles of base
metal (16.95%), articles of stone, plaster, cement etc. (9.32%), animal
products (8.47%) and vegetable products (8.47%) respectively.
A closer analysis of the SG actions by the major user countries
(i.e., India, Jordan, Turkey and Chile) at the HS sectional level are
reported in Table 1.
58

Kitt, supra note 5, at 372.
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and Parts Thereof; Prepared Feathers and
Articles Made Therewith; Artificial Flowers;
Articles of Human Hair

Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement, Asbestos, Mica
or Similar Materials; Ceramic Products; Glass
and Glassware

Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal

Machinery and Mechanical Appliances; Electrical
Equipment; Parts Thereof; Sound Recorders and
Reproducers, Television Image and Sound
Recorders and Reproducers, and Parts and
Accessories of Such Articles

Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and Associated
Transport Equipment

Optical, Photographic, Cinematographic,
Measuring, Checking, Precision, Medical or
Surgical Instruments and Apparatus; Clocks and
Watches; Musical Instruments; Parts and
Accessories Thereof

Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles
Total

XII

XIII

XV

XVI

XVII

XVIII

XX

0
29

0

0

0

2

0

0

1

0
16

0

0

2

3

4

1

0

0
17

3

1

3

0

2

1

1

Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO Safeguards database up to Oct. 2014

Textiles and Textile Articles

XI

1
13

0

0

0

2

0

0

1

0
14

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
7

0

0

1

0

2

1

0

0
13

2

1

3

0

0

1

1

0
7

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

2015] SAFEGUARDS IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
577

578 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:4

No clear sectoral trend, however, emerges from the SG actions
analysis, which implies that country-specific domestic compulsions
perhaps play a greater role in this context. For instance, in case of
India, it is observed that nearly 62.07% of the SG investigations and
85.71% of the measures are being imposed on chemical products. On
the other hand, Jordan’s SG initiations have mainly been carried on
prepared foodstuff and articles of stone. Turkey has imposed several
SG actions on machinery and precision equipment, while Chile has imposed a number of such measures on live animals and vegetable products. On the other hand, looking at the data for developed countries, it
is observed that in the US, 50% of the SG measures have been imposed
on articles of base metals, and animal products and vegetable products
have faced one SG measure each. In the EU, one SG measure has been
imposed for animal products, prepared foodstuff, and base metals
each. In other words, the SG actions by major developed and developing countries have affected both primary sector imports as well as the
same from low-tech and high-tech products.
III.

UNDERSTANDING THE USE AND MISUSE OF SAFEGUARDS:
ANALYSIS OF WTO SCM DISPUTES

The current section attempts to analyse the disputes lodged at
WTO’s forum on SG-related concerns, and later reviews the litigants
in these disputes.
A. Quantitative Analysis of WTO Litigation on SCM
It is observed from the WTO dispute gateway that a total of
forty-three cases have been lodged between 1995 and 2014 on this provision.59 The data shows that several SG provisions have been misused on quite a few occasions, both by developed and developing
countries. The SG actions by developing countries have increased considerably over the last decade, in line with the decline in their tariff
barriers.60 The US has been the respondent in almost 34.88% of the
SG-related disputes, though a number of these disputes were focusing
on a similar problem. For instance, although DS 259 (complaint by
Brazil), DS 258 (complaint by New Zealand), DS 254 (complaint by
Norway), DS 253 (complaint by Switzerland), DS 252 (complaint by
China), DS 251 (complaint by South Korea), DS 249 (complaint by Japan), DS 248 (complaint by EC) are considered different cases here,
they were focusing on the same issue: an increase in duties on imports
of iron and steel products in the US. The WTO panel and appellate
59

See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_
agreements_index_e.htm?id=A20.
60
Id.
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body noted that the serious injury provision and other clauses were
violated by the US actions.61 Subsequently, DS 274 (complaint by Taiwan) also focused on US SG actions imposed on iron and steel products.62 DS 202 (complaint by South Korea), lodged in the later period
on line pipe products, led to the finding that the US failed to establish
a causal link between the increased imports and the serious injury,
and also failed to provide an adequate opportunity for prior consultations with interested parties, among other measures.63
United States SG actions in the area of primary products have
also been successfully challenged by partners at times. For instance,
DS 178 (complaint by Australia), DS 177 (complaint by New Zealand),
involving Safeguard Measure on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen
Lamb, and DS 166 (complaint by EC), focusing on Safeguard Measure
on Imports of Wheat Gluten, deserves mention here.64 The dispute settlement bodies in these cases indicated WTO-incompatibility of US
investigation procedure and SG duty determination, among other
findings.65
In line with the US experience, a clustering of disputes on similar issues has been noticed in cases of developing countries as well,
given the nature of SG action involving imports “irrespective of its
source.”66 For instance, Argentina has faced several disputes on the
SG front to date. Three of these disputes are based on the Footwear
61

See Panel Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Certain Steel Products, WT/DS259/R (July 11, 2003); Appellate Body Report,
United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003).
62
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Taiwan, United States—Definitive
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS274 (Nov. 1
2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds274_e
.htm.
63
See Panel Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/R (Oct. 29,
2001); Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/
R (Feb. 15, 2002).
64
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Australia, United States—Safeguard Measure on Imports of Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Lamb from Australia, WT/
DS178 (Nov. 21, 2001) available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds178_ehtm; Request for the Establishment of a Panel by European Community, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, WT/DS166 (Jan. 19 2001), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds166_e.htm.
65
United States—Safeguard Measure on Imports of Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen
Lamb from Australia, supra note 64; United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, supra note 64.
66
See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 2.2.
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Imports—DS 164 (complaint by USA), DS 123 (complaint by Indonesia), and DS 121 (complaint by EC). In the case of DS 121, the DSB
noted that the provisional SG measure in the form of specific duties
was not consistent with WTO provisions.67 DS 238 (complaint by
Chile) focuses on Safeguard Measures on Preserved Peaches.68 The
DSB verdict in this case indicated unsatisfactory performance by the
competent authorities while determining the extent of serious injury.69 Recently, four disputes have been lodged against Argentina—
DS 446 (complaint by Mexico), DS 445 (complaint by Japan), DS 444
(complaint by US), and DS 438 (complaint by EU), all of which are
targeted at Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods.70
A similar clustering effect is noted in the case of another Latin
American country, Chile, as well. For instance, DS 356 and DS 351
(Argentina is complainant in both cases) concerns Safeguard Measures
on Certain Milk Products; DS 278 (complaint by Chile) looks into Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Fructose, while DS 230 and
DS 228 (Columbia is complainant in both cases) concerns Safeguard
actions on Sugar. DS 220 (complaint by Guatemala)71 and DS 207
(complaint by Argentina), on the other hand, relate to the Price Band
System in Chile and its Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products.72 Responding to the complaint in DS 207, the DSB
indicated violation of several relevant WTO provisions by Chile. DS
418 (complaint by El Salvador), DS 417 (complaint by Honduras), DS
416 (complaint by Guatemala) and DS 415 (complaint by Costa Rica),
67

Panel Report, Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/
DS121 (Feb. 11, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds121_e.htm.
68
See Panel Report, Argentina—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Preserved Peaches, WT/DS238 (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds238_e.htm.
69
Id.
70
Panel Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, WT/
DS446 (Aug. 24, 2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds446_e.htm; Panel Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, WT/DS445 (Sept. 26, 2014), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds445_e.htm; Panel Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, WT/DS444 (Sept. 26, 2014), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds446_e.htm; Id.
71
Panel Report, Chile—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain Milk Products,
WT/DS356 (Aug. 1, 2008); Panel Report, Chile—Definitive Safeguard Measure on
Imports of Fructose, WT/DS278 (Dec. 20, 2002); Dispute Settlement, Chile—Safeguard Measures and Modification of Schedules Regarding Sugar, WT/DS356
(April 17, 2001).
72
Request for Consultations by Argentina, Chile—Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/1 (Oct. 12,
2000).
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on the other hand, are lodged against the Safeguard Duties on Imports
of Polypropylene Bags and Tubular Fabric by the Dominican Republic.73 The WTO-incompatibility of the Dominican Republic’s actions
has been noted by the WTO dispute settlement panel in their verdict.74 The clustering of disputes is an indicator of the level of conviction complainant countries have over the validity of their claim on one
hand and the violations of WTO provisions on the other.
B. DSB Complaints on Safeguard Related Disputes
Table 2 is constructed by adopting the framework developed in
Chaisse and Chakraborty for understanding the dynamics of the SGrelated complaints lodged at the DSB.75 It is observed that although
the number of SG disputes declined after 2002, the incidence of the
same has increased in 2010 and 2012.

73

Request for Consultations by El Salvador, Dominican Republic—Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Prolypropylene Bags and Tubular Fabric, WT/DS418/7
(Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds418_e.htm.
74
Report of the Panel, Dominican Republic—Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Polypropylene Bags and Tubular Fabric, WT/DS415/R-WT/DS416/R-WT/DS417/RWT/DS418/R (Jan. 31, 2012) available at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_
Search/FE_S_S006.aspx.
75
See Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules through
Negotiations and Sanction: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 153 (2007).
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Table 2: Analysis of DSB Complaints on Safeguard related Disputes76
Global Scenario
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2005
2006
2010
2012
Total

A
1
1
3
2
1
8
4
20

Year
1997
1999
2000
2002
Total

A
3
1
8
12

B
0

C
D
E
F
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
5
13
4
4
1
Disputes with US as Respondent
B
C
D
E
F
1
1
1
0
1
0
2
0

G
1
1

Total
2
2
4
3
7
11
1
2
2
4
5
43

G
0

Total
1
3
2
9
15

Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO Safeguard-related disputes

Following their methodology, the SG complaints lodged at the
DSB are placed under seven different categories, from a complainant’s
perspective. The first two columns represent victory and defeat in a
particular case. Victory by a complainant is defined as determination
of WTO-inconsistency in the respondent’s alleged policy at the panel
level, which remains unchanged even if the appellate body later
reverses certain legal interpretations of the verdict, since the existence
of a WTO-incompatible policy has been established. However, rejection
of the complainant’s claims, initially at panel stage and subsequently
at the appellate body level, is defined as defeat. The cases classified
under the third column encompass several possibilities, namely cases
at consultation stage, disputes currently for consideration at the appellate body stage, cases where panel verdict is expected within a specified time or cases which have never been officially closed. The fourth
column signifies the scenario where the complainant and the respondent jointly request DSB for suspension of proceeding after panel for76

A – Victory for complainant; B – Defeat for complainant; C – Continuing/result
expected soon/case with Appellate Body/not officially closed; D – Request to
suspend panel proceeding; E – Panel not formed/formed but not composed; F –
Amicably settled; G – Discontinuation of the alleged measure by the respondent
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mation. This clearly indicates traces of flexibility in the respondent
country to negotiate the alleged measures in force.
The fifth column shows the cases where no panel had been
formed, potentially implying mutual discussion, probably leading the
respondent to guarantee the desired market access for the complainant to resolve the dispute. However, two other possibilities cannot be
ruled out in this case. First, a complaint might have been raised for
harassing the respondent as a trade policy instrument and second, a
complainant might have lacked the necessary technical expertise to
support the claim, and decided to opt out before formation of the panel.
The sixth column notes the cases where a mutually agreeable solution
has been notified to the DSB. In the last column, the cases where the
alleged measure was promptly discontinued after the initial notification at DSB are placed. The last column on one hand indicates the
existence of a WTO-incompatible measure in force, and highlights the
effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanism on the other.
The top and the bottom panels of Table 2 represent the global
SG dispute scenario and the same for the US respectively. The US scenario is reported separately because the country has faced the most
complaints for violating its obligations from partner countries. It is observed from the top panel that among the forty-three cases lodged at
the WTO on SG provisions during the period under consideration, on
twenty occasions (46.51% of the cases), the WTO-incompatibility of the
alleged measure was proven.77 Interestingly, not proven on a single
occasion was a safeguard-related complaint rejected.78 On four occasions (9.30% of the cases), the parties did not persist in the dispute by
requesting to suspend panel proceedings, as a result of which these
cases are still not officially closed. Only in four cases was the initial
complaint not actively pursued, resulting in the formation/composition
of no panel. Amicable settlement between parties79 and discontinua77

The comparable figure for CVM related cases stands at 36.14%. Debashis
Chakraborty et al., supra note 2, at 208. This indicates greater intensity in potential abuse of the SG provisions, despite lesser number of initiations vis-à-vis SCM
provisions.
78
This is again in sharp contrast with the experience under ADA and ASCM related cases, where the respondent has won a number of times. For instance, in DS
221 involving Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the dispute
settlement body noted that Canada has failed to establish that section US actions
were inconsistent with Articles VI:2, VI:3 and VI:6(a) of the GATT 1994, Articles 1,
9.3, 11.1 and 18.1 and 18.4 of the ADA, and Articles 10, 19.4, 21.1, 32.1 and 32.5 of
the ASCM among other provisions. Panel Report, United States—Section 129(c)(1)
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, WT/DS221/R (July 15, 2002).
79
Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Slovakia—Safeguard Measure on Imports of Sugar, WT/DS235/2 (Jan. 16, 2002).
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tion of the alleged measure by respondent80 have each been observed
once.
It is observed from the bottom panel that the US has lost
twelve out of the fifteen cases (80%) faced as respondent, signifying
strong justification behind the claims lodged by their trade partners.
On two occasions, no panel was formed.81 Notably, no case involving
the US has been amicably settled, nor have any requests for suspending the panel proceedings ever been submitted to the WTO. This
denotes the intensity of the conflict between the US and their partners
on Safeguard grounds. However, since 2003, no new SG cases have
been lodged against the US. This is quite different vis-a-vis ADA and
ASCM scenarios, where the misuse of those provisions by the US has
been alleged regularly by other WTO member countries, notably the
developing countries.82
Among major developing countries, the SG disputes lodged
against Chile (eight disputes) and Argentina (eight disputes) deserve
special mention. In case of both countries, the SG measures in question were proven WTO-incompatible at times.
IV.

EXPLORING THE MISUSE OF SAFEGUARDS: WHICH ARTICLES
SAFEGUARD AGREEMENT ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MISUSE?

OF

THE

The overall trend analysis based on SG-related complaints
lodged in DSB in the preceding section is supplemented in the following with an article-level micro analysis. With this objective, each individual safeguard-related dispute is analysed with respect to the
alleged violations under particular provisions in the WTO ASG.
A. Allegations of WTO Violations
The article-level data on alleged/conclusively proven violations
from individual disputes on SG provisions has been obtained by accessing the cases reported at the Safeguard Gateway among WTO web80

Communication from Chile, European Communities—Definitive Safeguard
Measure on Salmon, WT/DS326/4 (May 17, 2005).
81
See generally Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Steel Wire
Rod Circular Welded Quality Line Pipe, WT/DS214/4 (Aug. 10, 2001) (requesting a
panel that was never formed); Request for Consultations by Columbia, United
States—Safeguard Measures Against Imports of Broom Corn Brooms, WT/DS781/1
(May 1, 1997).
82
See generally Debashis Chakraborty et al., supra note 2, at 208 (stating that the
articles of the SCM agreement are susceptible to misuse).
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resources.83 The alleged violations, as revealed from the complaints,
are reported in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Alleged violation of WTO Safeguard Provisions at DSB
(by Article)
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Source: Constructed by authors from WTO Safeguard related disputes

It is observed from the figure that Article 2 (conditions), Article
4 (determination of serious injury or threat thereof) and Article 5 (application of safeguard measures) of the Safeguard agreement have allegedly been violated the most (14.81% of the total alleged violations
each). The other provisions allegedly being violated include Article 12
(notification and consultation) and Article 3 (investigation), which account for 13.58% and 12.35% of the total number of alleged violations
respectively. Article 7 (duration and review of safeguard measures),
Article 8 (level of concessions and other obligations), and Article 9 (provisions relating to developing country members) come next with alleged violations in 7.82%, 6.58%, and 6.17% of the cases respectively.
Article 11 (prohibition and elimination of certain measures) and Article 6 (provisional safeguard measures) witnessed violations in 4.53% of
the cases each.
83

Safeguard Measures, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/safeg_e/safeg_e.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
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B. Allegations of WTO Violations at Sub-Article Level
Figure 5 attempts to understand the alleged safeguard violations at the sub-article level, by analyzing the WTO disputes.
Figure 5: Alleged violation of WTO Safeguard Provisions at DSB
(by Sub-Article)
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Source: Constructed by authors from WTO Safeguard related disputes

It is observed from Figure 5 that major SG violations take
place under Article 2.1 (condition for imposing safeguard measures),
Article 3.1 (opportunity to exporters to respond and publication of the
findings), Article 5.1 (application of safeguard measure only to the necessary extent), Article 4.2 (evaluation of all relevant factors during investigation), Article 4.1 (definition of serious injury and threat of
serious injury), Article 12.3 (opportunity for consultations before applying or extending safeguard measures), Article 2.2 (application of
safeguard measure on imports irrespective of its source), Article 8.1
(adequate means of trade compensation), Article 3.2 (confidentiality of
information), Article 9.1 (provisions relating to application of safe-
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guard measures on developing country imports), Article 12.2 (notification of evidence to Committee on Safeguards), Article 12.1 (safeguard
notifications), Article 7.1 (application of safeguard measure only for
the necessary period), Article 7.4 (progressive liberalization of applied
measure and mid-term review provisions), and Article 5.2 (allocation
of quota while implementing the safeguard measure).
C. Lesson from Litigation: Actual Violations of ASG
It is clearly observed from the analysis that almost all the major provisions in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards have been allegedly violated in both developed and developing countries. In order to
identify the provisions more prone to violation, the above-mentioned
methodology is applied now to the completed cases (i.e., where the verdict of the dispute settlement panel/appellate body has been released).
In the current context, only cases reported under columns A of Table 2
are included for the analysis.84 The findings are summarized in Figure 6.

84

Here the cases involve the ones where panel rulings or the appellate body verdicts (if the defeated party challenged the panel ruling) have been made. On the
DSB role in the WTO system, see generally Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita,
Maintaining the WTO’s Supremacy in the International Trade Order – A Proposal
to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 9 (2013).
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Figure 6: Actual violations of WTO Safeguard Provisions –
DSB rulings
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Source: Constructed by authors from WTO Safeguard related disputes

It is observed from Figure 6 that actual violations have taken
place most frequently (sixteen times) under Article 2.1 (condition for
imposing safeguard measures), which accounts for 10.32% of the total
number of violations. The actions of WTO Members have been proven
to be WTO-incompatible under Article 3.1 (opportunity to exporters to
respond and publication of the findings) and Article 4.2 (evaluation of
all relevant factors during investigation) fourteen times each. The alleged violation against both Article 9.1 (provisions relating to non-application of safeguard measures on developing country imports) and
Article 4.1 (definition of ‘serious injury’ and ‘threat of serious injury’)
has been confirmed by WTO DSB twelve times. Article 8.1 (adequate
means of trade compensation) and Article 12.3 (opportunity for consultations before applying or extending safeguard measures) has been
proved WTO-incompatible ten times each. Article 5.1 (serious
prejudice), Article 12.1 and Article 12.2 (application of Article VI of
GATT 1994) have been misused nine times each, while Article 3.2 (confidentiality of information), Article 5.2 (allocation of quota while implementing the safeguard measure), Article 7.1 (application of safeguard
measure only for the necessary period), and Article 7.4 (progressive
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liberalization of applied measure and mid-term review provisions) has
been proven WTO-incompatible eight times each. Like the case of
initiations, clearly actual violations have also taken place under each
and every major provision of the ASG.
The WTO cases demonstrate that in practice the reason behind
seldom applying the provisions on serious prejudice probably lie in its
vague legal text. There are still legal elements which are arguable and
need further clarification. There is also no clear threshold for subsidies
which causes “serious prejudice.” For example, phrases such as “significant” without any clarification and threshold makes these provisions
open to interpretation and misuse. But the actual challenge lies in fixing certain determinants to find serious prejudice because every case
on this aspect is unique and each dispute will have different threshold
and determinants to find serious prejudice.
The discussion so far explains why the WTO members, before
initiating the “serious prejudice” case, should always bear in mind the
possible difficulties and obstacles they can face and only after consideration of all pros and cons should they bring the dispute before the
WTO DSB. Moreover, it is apparent that today only developed countries can take advantage of the present legal text on serious prejudice
because they can potentially abuse the fact of difficulty for the complainant to demonstrate “serious prejudice” (especially for developing
countries) and thus can adopt subsidies which could have adverse consequences for international trade. The replacement of the phrase “serious prejudice” to “simple prejudice” would be one of the solutions to
this problem. This replacement would simplify the process of proof of
the adverse effect caused by subsidies to international trade. In this
case, the developing countries will gain from such reformation and the
result will be the reduction of adverse subsidies and therefore harmonization of international trade.
Thus, there is still room for further development of the concept
in order to make the application of serious prejudice provisions easier
for the complainant party and to avoid abuse by developed WTO members due to the inability of developing countries to initiate a case.
CONCLUSION
The GDP and trade growth rate suffered across the countries
in 2011, thanks to the compounding effects of Arab spring and Greece’s
economic crisis, among other factors.85 The recession effect contributed
85

See World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Uncertainties and Vulnerabilities
1–30 (Jan. 2012), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS
/Resources/334934-1322593305595/82871391326374900917/GEP_January_2012a
_FullReport_FINAL.pdf (providing a general overview of economic activity and
prospects for the future around the globe).

590 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:4

in continued economic crisis in several developing countries during
late 2011 and early 2012. The rising SG-activism from 2010 onwards
can be explained in light of those developments. In 2011, Indonesia
justified the upward movement in its safeguard notifications on the
basis of growing “awareness” of their domestic industry about the contingency measures and their importance in protecting them from the
“negative effects of trade liberalization.”86
The ability of the governments to effectively determine
whether SG intervention is a necessary tool or not for reaping the free
trade advantages holds a crucial position.87 Over the period, however,
the emergence of SG actions as a major contingency measure with potential trade-restrictive usage has been an area of concern. As noted
earlier, the usage has increased mostly in developing countries (e.g.,
India, Indonesia, Chile, Ukraine) in the wake of import tariff decline.
The products targeted under the SG actions include both low-tech light
manufacturing products (e.g. woven fabrics of cotton, ceramic tableware, footwear) as well as consumer products (e.g. motorcycles, electrical appliances).88 The saving grace is that SG actions are less
discriminatory in nature than the AD actions, and are hence less problematic from the exporter’s view.89
Meanwhile, new cases have been brought, and sometimes with
innovations in terms of grounds for the claims. In April 2012, some
WTO members asked the Safeguards Committee to find whether or
not the SCM procedural requirements have been complied with in connection with the safeguard measures taken by Turkey on cotton
yarn.90 This is the first time Article 13.1(b) SCM has been invoked by
members.91 This provision provides that one of the functions of the
86

See Press Release, World Trade Org., Indonesia, Ukraine Lead Safeguard Notifications to the WTO (May 2, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/
safe_02may11_e.htm.
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See J. Michael Finger, GATT Experience with Safeguards: Making Economic
and Political Sense out of the Possibilities that the GATT Allows to Restrict Imports
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 2000, 1998) (providing suggested guidelines for a safeguard process that emphasizes an import restriction’s
impact on the domestic economy).
88
Committee on Safeguards, Report (2011) of the Committee on Safeguards to the
Council for Trade in Goods, G/L/972 (Nov. 1, 2011).
89
See Kitt, supra note 5, at 372–75.
90
See Request for Consultations by India, Turkey—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Cotton Yarn (Other Than Sewing Thread), WT/DS428/1, G/L/979, G/SG/
D41/1 (Feb. 15, 2012) (detailing India’s request that the Safeguards Committee
investigate Turkey’s compliance with safeguard measures related to its cotton
yarn imports).
91
In the review of 13 safeguard investigations reported to the Committee, the
following concerns were raised: On India’s safeguard measure on N1, 3-
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Safeguards Committee is “to find, upon the request of an affected
Member, whether or not the procedural requirements of this Agreement have been complied with in connection with a safeguard measure, and report its findings to the Council for Trade in Goods.”92
One major point of contention under the Doha Round negotiations regarding the Agreement on Agriculture has been devising a Special Safeguard Mechanism (“SSM”) both in terms of price and volume
triggers, which would be acceptable to both developed and developing
member countries.93 Developing countries are strongly inclined in favour of the SSM option given the ease of its operation,94 but the proposals on this front, as outlined in the December 2008 draft,95 have so
far witnessed a very strong opposition between developed and developing nations. As a result, the formal introduction of this provision in
trade policies in the coming future may also usher in increasing disputes on the newly adopted measures. In October 2012, the Friends of
Safeguards Procedures (“FSP”) (a WTO grouping made of Australia,
Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway,
Chinese Taipei, Singapore, and the United States) expressed concern
about “procedural, transparency, and due process issues” related to
safeguard investigations.96 The FSP especially cited the following “examples of where there appears to be an emerging and serious disregard of multilateral rules”: imposition of provisional safeguard
measures without clear evidence; lack of rationale and consistency in
the data examined during the investigation; “suspension” of previously
dimethylbutl-N Phenyl paraphenylenediamine, the US complained that India had
never acknowledged its request for consultations while the European Union expressed concern that the measure had replaced an anti-dumping measure. On
Thailand’s measure on glass block, the EU complained that the Thai measure was
on top of an existing anti-dumping measure. On Turkey’s measure on polyethylene
terephthalate, India raised doubt as to whether threat of serious injury existed.
On Ukraine’s safeguard measure on motor cars, the EU and Japan raised doubt as
to whether there was surge of imports. The EU noted that Indonesia had reported
four safeguard actions, and urged Indonesia to exercise utmost caution in using
safeguards.
92
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93
Robert E. Baldwin, Resolving the Conflict Leading to the Collapse of the Doha
Round, VOXEU (Sept. 25, 2008) http://www.voxeu.org/article/how-resolve-dohastalemate-better-agricultural-safeguard-trigger.
94
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imposed safeguard measures; untimely notifications to the Committee;
and unwarranted safeguard investigations.97
The present discussion clearly indicates that unlike other trade
remedy issues, SG matters are not squarely addressed in the Doha
Development Agenda.98 While the result of the SG disputes reveal
that the alleged measures in most of the cases have been proven WTOincompatible, the cases have often been dragged for a long time, usually in excess of two years.99 The safeguards regulation is a sensitive
issue par excellence which makes it a stumbling block in Doha negotiations. But, the WTO jurisprudence can also be criticized,100 as the ineffectiveness of a normal WTO dispute settlement procedure to address
unjustifiable SG measures is blatant.101
Given the problems associated with the SG mechanism, this
may lead to a new wave of protectionism demonstrating how difficult it
is to control the use of a two-edged sword as a safeguard. We can only
emphasize the limited prospects for reforms, but obvious emergency
exists for liberal trade order. The present analysis shows an increase
in the number of SG initiations. Only a few SG of doubtful validity
were brought to the review of the DSB. Such a trend demonstrates the
non-respect of SG-related principles and the shift to litigation, thereby
shifting the burden on DSB, which by definition will take necessary
time to analyze temporary measures. The ASG framework has not
been able to respond to the corresponding challenges and there is a
need to address the following issues as a priority: applying an “Unforeseen Development” requirement; causality requirement; parallelism
doctrine; and legal requirement of structural adjustment. Moving towards this step will ensure the initial goals of GATT, which are to allow for a safety valve to members entitling them to undertake
restrictive measures. SG is politically necessary in order to undertake
liberalisation and to find the necessary majorities to do so at home.
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